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Abstract 
The Concept and Conceptions of Transnational and Global Law 
 
by Matej Avbelj 
 
The following contains a transcript of the workshop, which was held in June 2015 at the 
Graduate School of Government and European Studies in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The workshop 
marked the final stage of Dr. Avbelj’s research project, supported by the Slovenian 
Research Agency, which was dedicated to the Post-modern challenges of transnational law 
to the European Union. The workshop gathered four leading scholars in the field of 
transnational and global legal studies: Jose-Manuel Barreto, Mattias Kumm, Gianluigi 
Palombella and Neil Walker. They have touched on the contemporary most pressing issues 
of transnational and global legal regulation.  
 
 
 
Key words:.transnational and global legal regulation 
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I. Introduction 
How do we conceptually imagine transnational and global law? Is there still room for the 
conventional understanding of law or do we need to move beyond it? How does the chosen 
conceptual framework impact on global justice? Is there such a thing and how could or 
should be brought about? What is the role that legal education on the national level should 
play in times of transnational and global law? Do transnational and global laws pose a 
threat or do they present an opportunity for democracy, rule of law and human rights 
protection? Is this debate only theoretical, about the problems that are largely abstract and 
of concern to academic elites only; or does it derive from the practical, real historical 
shifts, connected to demise of the nation state and development of global capitalism? If the 
latter, are transnational and global law conscious of the context from which they have 
emerged and in which they operate, so that they will not be used merely as another means 
of legitimating the world’s most powerful? Who is to answer these questions, in which 
fora, what are the relevant constituencies and, finally, criteria, shared or diverging, for 
assessing the answers' persuasiveness? 
These are some of the questions that the four speakers touched upon in a highly 
interactive dialogical exchange. The topicality of the issues and especially the quality of 
the discussion mandate to make the workshop’s content available to a larger scholarly 
community. This is why the substance of the workshop has been transcribed and is now, 
after several slight editorial touches, reproduced in this journal. While it is certainly 
departing from the traditional methodological canons of written scholarship, this 
contribution doubtlessly incorporates the essence of a high quality academic work. It is 
about original ideas concerning highly interesting practical matters, full of intellectual 
stimulus for further research and debate. As an editor, I entertain no doubt that this 
transcript makes a fantastic contribution to the vibrant scholarly field of transnational 
and global law.  
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Matej Avbelj:  
 
Good afternoon everyone. First of all, thank you very much for coming today. I am 
especially grateful to our speakers who came from various places around Europe to be 
here with us and to make this workshop actually possible. Thank you very much for being 
here. I would like to start by saying a few words about the idea of the workshop, how it is 
going to be structured and about the context that it is set in.  
 
This workshop is supported by the Slovenian Research Agency and is envisaged as a final 
leg of my postdoctoral project, which has been concerned with the question of postmodern 
challenges of transnational law for the EU. This project addresses many topical issues and 
challenges – I am thinking about modernity and the shift to postmodernity, reflecting on 
using legal pluralism as a paradigm through which we can approach the legal questions 
and challenges spurred by transnational law to the EU. Of course to do so, one has to have 
a conception and understanding of transnational law, as well as of the EU.  
 
Much of my project has been influenced by my earlier work: by my work at NYU School of 
Law and at the EUI and other international academic sites where I worked and studied, and 
it was there where I got in touch with the work, ideas, and theories, thought-provoking 
challenges by today’s distinguished guests. It has been their work that has inspired me a 
lot, and posed a number of challenges to me, as well as interesting questions, to which I 
have tried to find the answers. Therefore, it is really my great honour to have these great 
academics with us today to discuss the elusive nature of transnational and global law and 
their impact on our (legal) world as we have known it.  
 
Today’s workshop is going to ask a question about the concept and conceptions of 
transnational and global law. It is going to be broken down into two parts. In the first part, 
we are going to discuss the conceptual and the methodological issues related to 
transnational and global law. In the second part, we will move more towards normative 
questions, to the “as-applied” challenges of transnational and global law. We will, in 
conclusion, also take some questions from the audience.  
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Having said all that, we should get started. The first question and challenge that I would 
like to put on the table is about the very subject matter of the today’s workshop. Speaking 
about, the concept and conceptions of transnational and global law, we should ask first: 
what is global law, what is transnational law and why, if at all, is important to talk about 
them today?  
   
I would like to start with you Neil, for a very simple reason, since you have recently 
published a book on Intimations of Global Law,1 in which you, inter alia, concentrate 
precisely on these questions. 
 
Neil Walker:  
 
Thank you very much Matej. It will take me about three and a half hours to read out the 
entirety of my new book, so you can all sit back and relax! Seriously, thank you for the 
introduction and it is great to be here. I have been here once before a number of years ago 
and very much enjoyed it. It is nice to be back, especially among such an interesting group.  
 
Let me start by saying something that might seem fairly obvious. The reason why there is 
such an emphasis upon concepts such as transnational law and global law - and in due 
course we can look at the distinction between these two terms - is that there seems to be 
awareness, an intuition and a sense, certainly within academic community that there has 
been a “decentering” of state law. State law is no longer viewed as being at the centre of 
the legal universe in the way it once was. Let me say something about this and how we 
may characterise this. Obviously, this is a very stylized history – it is no part of my 
argument that one day we lived in a state-based system that the next day was transformed 
into something else. The state-based system was always a partial system and also an 
imperial system, a system organised around western states with their colonies and 
empires beyond this. It was never a system which was undifferentiated – it knew internal 
differences and co-existed with other political structures.  
 
The state based system was thus never hegemonic. It was a framework for thinking about 
law which was nevertheless very powerful. It was a framework based upon the centrality 
                                                 
1 Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law (CUP, 2014). 
4 
 
 
of state sovereignty (both externally and internally). I think maybe one way to describe it, 
and one of the ways I tried to describe it in the ‘Intimations’ book was to say it was based 
upon what I called a triple divide – i.e. three sets of divisions. One of the divisions is a 
straightforward division between what you might call the internal and the external. The 
idea of the ‘internal-external’ division is that the internal sovereignty and external 
sovereignty inhabit quite different domains of law. There is something called domestic 
constitutional law and something called international law. Through internal sovereignty 
we have domestic law including constitutional law. Through external sovereignty each of 
these sovereigns has a voice and a title to participate in international relations. This is a 
straightforward distinction. 
 
The second distinction in the triple division is what I call the ‘internal-internal’ division, 
which is to say that as regards each of the states and each of their internal orders, they are 
mutually exclusive - they are hermetically sealed off. The domestic law of country A is 
sealed-off the domestic law of country B. The internal-internal distinction is also 
important.  
 
But also the third distinction which I call the ‘external-external’ division is important. 
There is a further and ‘outer’ frontier in international relations, which says that the only 
key actors themselves are states, and that the external or international realm itself is 
limited to relations between states, with all other transnational actors invisible or 
consigned to some lesser outer realm.    
 
If that is a starting point then of course there always were examples of public 
international law in its recognition of international organisations, of private international 
law, and of various different forms of specialist transnational law, ius commune et cetera, 
that challenged these neat divisions.   But what we are seeing in the context of the present 
wave of globalisation is a massive intensification of the movement which breaks down 
these three sets of divisions. This could have been through the creation of supranational 
organisations, such as the EU or international organisations, such as UN, the  World Trade 
Organisation etc. Or could it be from within the state itself, from sub-state federal or 
quasi-federal units within the states. Or could it be from the private world, i.e. anything 
from FIFA – a good example for these days. The international Olympic Committee or let’s 
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say ICANN which deals with the regulation of the internet – a hybrid public-private body, 
or the ISO - International Standards Organisation which e.g. specifies the detailed 
standards of every piece of furniture in this room. What we are talking about is a vast 
movement of regulation of a sort which defies the received ‘box-matrix’ model of the 
three divisions.  
 
I am going to stop here because beyond that it would simply be making too much of a 
negative point – about the shape of what is no longer there rather than the terms of the 
new configuration. There are all sorts of questions, e.g. why this has happened, what the 
normative implications of that are, and also quite crucial to the debate is how we 
subcategorise and label the parts of the new order egg distinguishing , let’s say, 
transnational law from global law etc. I will leave these questions on the table and answer 
them later on. 
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
Thank you very much Neil. Mattias maybe you could jump in here and add something to 
the previous two questions, as well as taking it a step further to the question of legality of 
transnational and global law. How do we know that transnational and global law are really 
law? 
 
Mattias Kumm:   
 
I will try to make at least a little progress towards answering some of these hard 
questions. There are two basic ways in which the legal world we inhabit has changed since 
1990. On the one hand new institutions and new legal norms have been created, as Neil 
has described. On the other hand the basic normative background understanding – the 
cognitive frame we use to engage these institutions and norms as lawyers - has changed. 
Both are connected to political and social changes following the end of the Cold War. Let 
me elaborate just a little. 
 
After 1990 there was a widespread confidence that the world is no longer best understood 
as constituted by a number of major powers with their own legal systems competing with 
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one another economically, politically and militarily. Instead there was the hope and 
expectation that great power competition, or competition between major ideological 
opponents was effectively over. The regulative ideal informing the legal imagination after 
1990 - not just in the western world - was the idea of a world made up of equally 
sovereign states, that shared two basic commitments.  
 
First, state´s internal constitutional structure would reflect a commitment to human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law – they would aspire to be liberal constitutional 
democracies. Post 1990’s all the new states that emerged and all new constitutions that 
were enacted, were basically attempts to contextualise in an appropriate way the idea of 
liberal constitutional democracy. In that sense a commitment to human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law had become the foundational grammar for the justification of 
legitimate authority. These three general principles of law were now understood to 
effectively constitute the Trinitarian dogma of a global constitutionalist faith. But the shift 
was not just one that concerned the legal imagination: International law – human rights 
law, in particular – was now effectively understood as requiring states to institutionalize 
these commitments as a matter of domestic constitutional law, and gross systemic 
violations of these commitments might potentially trigger humanitarian intervention in 
the name of the global community, exercising its responsibility to protect. In that way 
globalisation goes right to the heart of the constitutional identity of each equal sovereign 
state. 
 
Second, these liberal constitutional democracies would be legally integrated into a larger 
global community which itself would have to meet certain rule of law requirements. What 
made this larger order global rather than just international was not just that new 
institutions, including new courts and tribunals, that would discipline states more 
effectively.  To effectively organize the global economy non-traditional actors, be they 
private actors (such as investors), Central Bankers (in the Basel Committee), or NGO non-
traditional rule-makers (such as ISO or ICANN) and other institutions were starting to play 
an important role.  
 
The aftermath of the Cold war thus saw the emergence of the global hegemony of shared 
constitutionalist background assumptions relating to human rights, democracy and the 
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rule of law as well as a more powerful network of border-transcending actors and 
institutions of an increasingly integrated global economy.  Both developments challenged 
classical positivist will-based and state-based understandings of law and produced a 
plethora of new attempts to conceptualize new phenomena, that Neil’s book describes well.   
 
Gianluigi Palombella:   
 
I think that we should better clarify here, for the benefit of the audience, a further aspect 
of the state of affairs. Let us uphold the question asked by our host Matej, about the 
concept and the conceptions of global law. In general, the couple (concept-conceptions) was 
famously elaborated by Dworkin: on the premise of socially shared meanings, that like 
courtesy and respect, are community dependent.  
 
Global law is a practice, reflected upon mainly by epistemic communities of experts and 
scholars, and bearing socially elusive features. Unsurprisingly, its very paradigm is 
contended upon in the hegemonic attempt of at least three separate strands: like private 
law, public international law and Global Administrative Law (GAL), let alone the attempt to 
design a further global constitutionalist architecture. Each of them aspire to offer the 
clavis universalis, the explanatory rationale: from the pervasive spontaneous new wave of 
private lex mercatoria to the State-dependent public international law control of 
jurisgenerative fragments; finally to the network of global self referential regulatory 
entities with administrative capacity enhanced in the perspective of GAL as a brand-new 
phenomenon irreducible to the private-public international law categories of the past.  
 
Our ‘descriptions’ and our ‘conceptions’ have here a constructive and normative 
momentum. All the more so, if we realize that ‘global law’ appeals to its higher, 
comprehensive primacy over lower and less-than-global orders, that are required to abide 
by it and implement its outputs.  Global legality invokes and avails of its coordinative, all-
embracing and rationalizing role vis à vis the ‘particularity’ and narrower spectrum of 
normativity covered by any other interlocutors. And this pretense of directive primacy 
equates the picture of the multilevel plural legalities on the globe to a Russian-dolls-like 
image that I believe is precisely the one we should better oppose.   
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As we might come to discuss later on, I believe we have to bear in mind that ‘being global’ 
(a global regime, a global regulatory authority, global legislation, norm production  and so 
forth) meant as a matter of  planetary reach admittedly amounts to a sheer fact. However, 
it does not coincide, neither conceptually nor historically, with universality. Contrariwise, 
the claim to universality is a normative stance, in need of and working as a selective 
check. It can be conceded only on the basis of criteria of justification, from viewpoints that 
are independent upon the claimant. The gap between ‘globality’ and universalizability is a 
fundamental issue in the fight among ‘conceptions’. At the same time it is precisely where 
dialogue, resistance, confrontation among different concurring or competing legalities 
should take place and should be about. I stop here, but as you know I have tried to 
elaborate upon this issue at length, also in my book.2  
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
Having said that, having shed light on the emergence of transnational and global law 
through the evolution of actual practices, but also by way of changing the cognitive 
framework,  before moving on to new questions, let me go briefly back to you Neil. To the 
benefit of the audience and all those interested, could you elaborate a little bit more on the 
distinction between international law, transnational law and global law?  
 
 
Neil Walker:  
 
Let’s first stick to these three terms, which are somewhat reductive labels. Each one of 
these terms is of course contested. So international law is the older term. It comes from 
what the opposition to state law. Indeed, international lawyers of a certain neo-Kelsenian 
sort assume that the state law comes from international law, and so treating international 
law as the fundamental jurisgenerative source, they would happily colonise other areas of 
transnational law etc. But international law is normally understood more narrowly as the 
                                                 
2 Gianluigi Palmobella, E’ possibile una legalità globale. Il Rule of law e la governance del mondo (Is 
global legality possible? The Rule of law and global governance), Il Mulino, Bologna 2012; but also 
elsewhere for English readers for ex. Gianluigi Palombella, ‘The Rule of Law in Global Governance. Its 
normative construction, function and import’, The Straus Institute Publications, NYU, New York, 5/2010 
(2011) (pp. 1-57). 
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law between states. Both the ‘transactional’; law between states, but also things like ius 
cogens and general principles of international law - the more basic structure of general 
rules which are not based upon contract or transaction, but the key idea is still  inter-
national – the states are the key actors and subjects here.  
 
Transnational law is actually a term coined by Philip Jessup in the 1950s. It is a very broad 
term which covers any type of law where as a matter of jurisdiction, source, effect etc. 
there is a transnational element. Basically any law that is capable of crossing the national 
border. So this is supposed to be a capacious term – he coined it because he actually 
thought the notion of international law was becoming insufficient for the world which 
was already globalising in many ways. The real world of law was already breaking the 
boundaries of international law.  
 
The term global law is more recent and more contentious. I myself use it in a particular 
way. Let me just say three ways in which it is used – one way would be as a kind of 
alternative to the term transnational law. There you have to bear in mind that there is a 
lot of rhetorical usage of the idea of global law, e.g. global commercial firms will often talk 
about global law – in ways which are conceptually vague or misleading, but rhetorically 
perfect for their grandiose self-projections.  
 
A second way in which is used is actually a very thin way, where we are only dealing with 
global institutions. What the UN does would be called global law from that perspective and 
few others worldwide, or what you might call planetary institutions. I use it in a different 
way, namely to describe any form of law where regardless of its source or pedigree, its 
remit, ie.  the area it affects, its jurisdiction is in theory unlimited – e.g. not limited 
territorially, or to a particular citizenry, only limited in a way that all laws, as normative 
propositions,  logically must be limited, i.e. in terms of its basic material remit or 
propositional terms  
 
So for example, we might think again of the general principles of international law, or we 
might think of emerging principles of the so-called ‘global administrative law’ as norms 
which are seen as somehow operating in a legal world, but they operate in a way which 
does not depend on a particular pedigree or particular state authority, and which has no 
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limitations other than the limitations which are actually imposed by the material content 
of the law itself.  
 
There is much more to be said about the idea of global law in my recent book. One of the 
things that interest me is the extent to which through the whole set of trends towards the 
naming of something in global law terms or in similar language - e.g. from the revival of 
notions of ius gentium or ius commune, to ideas of global administrative law, global 
constitutional law etc. there is a number of different ways of thinking about the 
normativity of what is involved. Sometimes it is much more conceptual than positive, 
abstract rather than grounded, more about ways of legal framing or models of law 
(administrative, constitutional etc) than particular rules. There is also a set of interesting 
questions about the extent to which something is simply proto-law or law in becoming, as 
opposed to something that is actually and effectively a legal norm. There is nevertheless 
an interesting semi-convergence of different ways of thinking about law through this 
common global imaginary. I will call this global law. This stands alongside international 
law in its narrower remit as a distinctive part of the broader set of transnational legal 
rules, though even some conventional rules of international law, ius cogens and the like, 
speak to a form of normativity that is claimed to be universal, so transcending the notion 
of a law between states, and to the extent that they assume an unlimited jurisdiction they 
edge into my ‘global law’ category.   
 
Jose-Manuel Barreto:  
 
I would like to add something here. My intention is to try, on the basis of your comment, to 
develop a concept of global law. You identify global law as a law whose centre is not the 
state anymore. For me this has to do with the fact that the state is not the only source of 
the law. The question thus emerges: Who else creates the law?  The contribution of the 
theory of global law has to do precisely with the realisation that there are other sources of 
law, like transnational companies and the international financial institutions (the IMF, the 
World Bank, the WTO). This is why it is important to speak about global law. And this 
creates the possibility of acting in two directions. You  engage with the law of the financial 
institutions or the law of the companies to legitimate  them, or you understand  them in 
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order to resist, or to try to avoid, the negative effects that those  laws can have in the life 
of people, e.g. in the health systems,  pensions, or in the sovereignty of a country.  
 
The second aspect I found very interesting in your initial presentation is that state law, 
even before the theory of global law has emerged, was not the only one. It was very 
important but it was not completely hegemonic. And you have said that it was an ‘imperial 
system’. I am not sure what exactly do you mean by ‘imperial system’, but I can understand 
that expression as an indication of the fact that some states  already had such 
accumulation of power and capital in history that were acting as empires or, simply,  were 
empires. What I am pointing at is the idea that historically there have been at least three 
main sources of law, namely the state, the empires, the companies associated with 
imperialism and, more recently, the very powerful international financial institutions. 
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
So far we have learned that transnational law is any law that has cross boundary effects. 
On the other hand, global law, as Neil has presented it, is something more of adjectival 
concept that actually has or aspires to a global, universal reach. And we have also learned 
that this new phenomena are causing some practically felt consequences and changes to 
the way the state as a self-contained legal entity used to function. If we take for granted 
that there is something like transnational and global law, we ought to think deeply about 
it, including what makes them law in the first place.  
 
Gianluigi, you have written a lot about legality in the global realm. How do you approach 
this question whether transnational law is law, whether global law is law, or is it more a 
proto-law and if the overall criteria, the conventional criteria that we knew from the state 
(source based criteria, pedigree criteria) are not available any more on the global 
transnational level, what is it that we are left with? Which kind of criteria do we have, 
according to which we can measure that something is law or not? What are your views on 
this? 
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Gianluigi Palombella:  
 
Let me note, the legal theory problem here is certainly a matter of speculation but behind 
that it is forced by reality, the emergence of the global law problem based upon a material 
situation made of intertwinement among factors of social, economic and financial, and 
also historical change. Since we cannot get rid of the reality of global interconnections, as 
a matter of fact, almost nothing remains self- contained. Except for legal regimes! Or at 
least that is the self-understanding upon which they work. Let me explain: global 
interconnections generate a problem of complexity control. In order to get to some 
control, the answer has been: divide et impera – the world has been more or less artificially 
fragmented into separate, specialised areas and functionally contained fields, that are 
consequently covered through isolated governance authorities, as many as necessary to 
organise almost every sector of life. Such authorities have started flourishing, from 
energy to sport and from finance to trade, to health, environment. And we know, Neil also 
reminded us, they have a limited capacity as to thematic functional objectives, but a global 
warrant. This is a quality and a feature we cannot forget. 
 
As a matter of fact, global regimes (as it seems about 2000) expose a massive regulatory 
capacity and reach, directly or indirectly, an indefinite number of addressees who often 
have no option, whether to be in or out. The quest for the credentials of ‘law’ starts 
consequently. So, summing up, first, material complexity, then, organizational divide et 
impera into specialised fields (fragmentation), the overwhelming regulatory outputs, and 
the quest for requirements of legality. In the last few years we are defining new series of 
features of legality that should be thought and conceived of, for the first time, 
independently of the Law-of-the-State paradigm (to which even international law, 
traditionally, is traced back). The extension – and the connotations- of legality are all the 
more a matter of dispute: and I tend to think now that we are not so much focusing on the 
question, whether something is or is not law: scholarship and practitioners tend to work 
on the functional presupposition that something is law. Jan Klabbers for example has aptly 
suggested that we should better work on a presumption (that something is law), one that 
can be contrasted, however, a posteriori by checking credentials of  the kind taught by 
Fuller, or in the opinion of Ben Kingsbury through requirements of ‘publicity’. Those and 
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other suggestions have somehow started a process of adaptation and adjustment, shifting 
the question to partially recasting the requisites that might qualify legality itself.  
 
The norm-like production on the global sphere is checked above all by relevant officials in 
the practice of a multiple series of rules of recognition, however segmented and 
institution-relative: in the lack of a unique and global legal system, where the grand box is 
clearly missing. There is a network of recognitions that makes up for the legality of much 
of the present ‘global legislation’. But even these ‘social sources’ based idea of legality-
validity is often complemented by increasing requirements of civility, that understandably 
are placed in the respect for natural justice, the rule of law, basic human rights, 
rationality, and the like. As I said earlier, though, being global law unable to ensure 
effectiveness without the acceptance by other legal orders and the compliance of others, 
foremost states, the very point of such legality lies in its being constantly in progress, and 
in itinere. Properly so. All in all, it depends upon the results of the encounter at the limen 
of regional or State legal orders. At this conjunction, the question is to be resolved, and as I 
believe, it is at this point that criteria of justification, legitimacy, substantive arguments 
from universalizability to proportionality and the like can play a crucial role.  
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
Mattias, would you like to add something here?  
 
Mattias Kumm:  
 
First of all let’s try to get a clear understanding of what the puzzle of legality is actually 
about. If we start off with a traditional positivist conception of law, that puts sources of 
law at the centre, then we might be tempted to say that fundamentally not much has 
changed, at least as far as our basic understanding of law is concerned, as it emerges from 
the point of view of a practicing lawyer. True, there are now more sources of law that 
lawyers need to be engaged with. Now, besides legislation or administrative actions by the 
executives of the states, we also have the EU as a very significant actor, definitely not a 
state, but it is legislating and providing regulations and directives and decisions which are 
sources of law. Or we have the UN Security Council enacting binding resolutions under 
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chapter 7. This is binding and is a source of law. On the other hand ISO standards are not a 
source of law unless there is a source of law that incorporates those standards by 
reference. Nor are UN General Assembly resolutions, even though they might be relevant 
for stablishing a norm as part of customary law. Nothing of this is puzzling or confusing to 
lawyers. Yes, the sources have multiplied and many of them only bear a tenuous relation 
to the state. But lawyers still work with source based posited norms as legal materials, just 
as they have been for a long time, there is just more of this stuff and from a greater 
variety of sources, including a variety of sources that are not state based. So from a 
lawyerly practical point of view nothing much appears to have fundamentally changed.  
 
But of course this is not the whole story, and there is something deeply misleading in the 
description I have just provided… 
 
Gianluigi Palombella:  
 
If I just may add to this. What Mattias was saying is an introduction to the big issue. If we 
go back to our received ideas, the conception of the law in states, we see that it is 
construed on the premise of a system. First, systemic authorities, the organic frame:  and 
then we have the proliferation of legislative or otherwise authorised enactments. So laws 
are thought to be ‘valid’ inside a premised system (one that we have known – conceptually 
contingent – as a state relative system). Now, it is very different in this case, because we 
do not have a global system and in a way the point is the inversion. It is like a relationship 
between software and hardware (in our PC). Normally we started from hardware and we 
got to the necessary specific software for that hardware to work. The legal system (and the 
state legal system) as we know them, were the hardware. So the software came after. In 
these global law heights it is precisely the opposite, it is reversed. We see a flourishing of 
diverse sources’ software, but we do not know precisely what the general hardware is. We 
try to answer and make up for some systemic frame, for software that to the old eyes 
seems flourishing out of our control.  
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Mattias Kumm:  
 
I want to jump in there, because there is a very traditional image underlying this choice of 
analogy, an image of the state somehow preceding law and creating law. This image has 
been, I think correctly, criticized by Kelsen as deeply metaphysically loaded and ultimately 
misguided. 
 
Gianluigi Palombella:  
 
I am not submitting such an idea. It is not my point. The relevant point in my analogy is 
not placed outside the law, the analogy fulcrum is not the state, it is the legal system. And 
as a matter of fact, we were used to conceive of mature law starting from a legal system. 
 
Mattias Kumm:  
 
The challenge is, and we might agree on this, to describe the variety of sources that we 
have in fact and that no lawyer would deny exist, as a coherent whole. Whereas 
traditionally – at least from the domestic context – the very idea of constitutionalism 
(something that holds everything together) reinforces the idea of unity and system. It is 
exactly this idea of unity and system that is threatened, when we try to describe the 
existing legal practice. We have no generally accepted account of how the world of law 
hangs together, and a deeply fragmented complex practice. So when someone talks about 
transnational law, global law, global constitutionalism etc. they are trying to give in 
account of how the world of law is structured, how things hang together. Each of these 
concepts comes with distinct cognitive orientations and normative assumptions about how 
to make sense of the world of law. 
 
These cognitive orientations and normative assumptions are not relevant only as part a 
philosophical pie in the sky speculation about how we might best understand the world of 
law; how we conceptualize the legal world, how we account for various legal sources is 
central to how we determine what counts as a persuasive legal argument. If there is a 
conflict between sources, we have to be able to say, which one of them takes precedent 
over the other, or how we might interpret the conflict between them, how to assess their 
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relative authority.  We have to work with these multiple sources to come up with a 
concrete answer to the questions that arise. So as we need a unified conceptual 
framework, we need the idea of a system. Concepts such as global law, global 
constitutionalism, global public law, transnational law etc. are all attempts at creating new 
paradigms of order, after the old order has broken down.  
 
Neil Walker:  
 
Can I come in there? What is really interesting is that we have to bear in mind that the 
points at which and the ways the people try to think systemically, in the way that Mattias 
and Gianluigi have talked about, are different in many ways. So it may come up in the 
context of a big case. So take a case that everyone knows about – the Kadi jurisprudence 
(of the CJEU in recent years). The question was to what extent the EU had to obey the edict 
of the UN in terms of their specification of the list of terrorist suspects who should have 
their financial assets suspended. There are a lot of stages to this saga over a number of 
years. But finally, it is dependent upon the model of a legal order – which model should 
prevail?  
 
One model of legal order was a pluralist model. For these purposes the world  is made up 
of a number of regional jurisdictions and effectively Europe is a king of its own castle. And 
for these purposes it can decide independently of the UN, what the standards should be by 
which this sort of decisions should be made. So the EU is not necessarily a message boy. 
And then there are two more models. One is a kind of top-down model, which sees 
hierarchical structures organised around the UN especially on questions of peace and 
security. There was, thirdly, a more normatively explicit model, which says it is not 
necessarily who wins between the UN and the EU. It is rather about there being some 
universal idea of human rights, which should apply between these two different sorts of 
orders. So, the model we are looking for here, is the model of normative coherence.  
 
Each of these different ways of thinking about it has a systemic component. But the 
systemic understanding of it has very different implication for how you resolve the cases. 
Among the interesting things about transnational law is that it increasingly throws up 
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moments where people are forced to think creatively about the clashes between different 
systemic understandings.  
 
The point is that it often happens; let’s call it the retail question – part of the problem with 
global law is often these questions come up in a retail context. The world is already there 
and is already made. There is already the deep structure – the wholesale questions have 
already been assumed or answered. But at another point there is a broader imaginative 
exercise, and a broader politics of framing. So the big debate about the reform of the UN is 
a debate which is also a debate about different models of law. But I don’t want to overstate 
this – it is a debate which takes place at a different point within the system. Gianluigi said 
something really interesting about control. And, of course, the point is:  lawyers are trying 
somehow to get a handle on the system – sometimes it is a retail handle – how do we re-
imagine the whole within this very particular microscopic context. And sometimes it is 
more about the wholesale handle. It is more likely that it is a retail handle. The way in 
which we come in to these questions is more likely to be in terms of reimagining in a very 
particular context the best understanding of a system and answering a very particular 
question in these terms. I think it is important to build up in our mind that the points and 
ways of intervention might be very different and also the ways of how people think about 
global law can be very different.  
 
One final example which probably anticipates things that we are going to be talking about 
later. If you take Mattias, who is associated with NYU Law School. So, around about 10 
years ago NYU Law School announced the global administrative law project. I was invited 
to this conference, as I happened to be in New York, but I said I could not make it. Little did 
I know that that was the start of a form intellectual entrepreneurship by which a bunch of 
people said: “Look! Here is a series of developments in the world and here is an attempt to 
try to give normative shape to these developments in ways, which somewhere down the 
line, will have doctrinal effects.”  
 
There are different things that are interesting. Whoever gave academics that kind of 
authority? One of the reasons they get to be players in that game is because the game is so 
open in terms of the re-imagination of the system. It will not look so ‘open’ if you are not a 
member of NYU Law School or part of the elite. It still tends for a certain set of global 
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actors to do that. But it is interesting because again it is not people intervening in a 
particular case, nor is it the ground of political actors of the UN. It is a bunch of jurists 
trying to think about this in terms of normative principles. But again the same basic 
exercise is involved. There is a normative re-imagination of the system as a system. But as 
a system, in which you know that it requires to be reimagined and to be reorganised 
because the old coordinates are no longer clear - they no longer provide clear answers 
they once did. 
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
Jose-Manuel you wanted to jump in? 
 
Jose-Manuel Barreto:  
 
Yes, I would like to come back to something that Neil mentioned a few minutes ago. 
Because I think it can help to clarify or to respond to the question what is global law, what 
is going on right now in the theory of law. What I like is the way Gianluigi presented the 
current situation of legal theory. He said we are trying to figure out legal theories that are 
able to catch up, to understand what is going on. We have been elaborating certain 
‘software’, which are ideas or concepts like global law, transnational law and global 
administrative law. Now we need to understand the ‘hardware', how all these things share 
something in common. I like this approach because it shows that law and the world are 
changing today. It is the historical change modifying the paradigm. And theories are being 
made. And still these theories are not able to completely grab or understand what is going 
on right now.  
 
And the second thing I would like to mention is this search for something more 
fundamental, perhaps going beyond the formal legal analysis. Mattias has said that at the 
level of the positivist conception of law not much has changed. It is the world that has 
changed. What if we approach law from a more historical or material point of view? So 
beyond the ‘hardware’, let’s see if we are able to understand the ‘computer’ itself. And 
beyond the ‘computer’, the process that led to the creation of that ‘computer’. And when I 
mention these material and historical sources, I am thinking of a phenomenon that has 
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already been mentioned: the social and historical changes in contemporary world – 
particularly globalisation. Globalisation can be understood in a more social and historical 
way as a source materially constituting the law we are dealing with. And what is behind 
globalisation? What if we think about globalisation in connection with the world economy 
the history of capitalism – accumulation of capital – and global capitalism? What do 
globalisation and global law have to do with capitalism? 
 
Gianluigi Palombella:  
 
Everything. 
 
Jose-Manuel Barreto:  
 
Yes, everything, but it is something, which we lawyers do not deal with usually. 
 
Neil Walker:  
 
But is it really true? I believe it is a received wisdom that lawyers do not deal with that – 
do not contemplate the bigger picture.  I think about these things much of the time and so 
do some of my colleagues. 
 
Jose-Manuel Barreto:  
 
Is there a theory of capital accumulation in your understanding of global law? Is there an 
understanding of the history of capitalism as the engine of global law? 
 
Neil Walker:  
 
It is certainly discussed, but at the end of the day, I do not have to embrace that view as – 
you know, the unalloyed truth of the matter – there are many forms of understanding of 
the globalisation. And most of them give a significant, even prime, place to the 
development of capitalism and economic relations. But it is not the only thing. We talk 
about other dimensions as well. So anyone that thought about this and did not get 
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economic factors as significant part of it would be crazy. He would be missing things in 
doing so. I agree, but I do not think that is true of other than a few complacent 
triumphalists, who think the globalisation of certain economic models and the Washington 
consensus etc is an unqualified good thing. And I think that there are not many people out 
there, who are not at least aware of the questions we are talking about. And I think many 
academic lawyers today have a decent awareness of these issues. 
 
Gianluigi Palombella:  
 
May I join here by coming back to the hardware-software point? At this stage of our 
discussion, I am still trying to offer some, say, ‘descriptive’ overview. I suggested the idea 
that while legal software flourishes, there is no system available. Nonetheless, we aspire to 
construct a frame, also due to the fact that global regulatory legality and normativity 
beyond the state are hardly developed as comprehensive, coherent, complete or organic. 
There is no need to argue. My suggestion is that instead of running after an all-
encompassing architecture in the global setting, we can do a better bottom-up job, trying 
assessments on a retail basis, i.e. case by case: our concern is how to cope with multiple 
legalities, the intercourses between them and the array of juris-generating entities. I have 
pointed often to the search for the rule of law criteria as inter-facial, in order to arbitrate 
the relations among orders in terms of fairness and justice. Not building up for the 
constitutional cover. And it is a different perspective. 
 
Mattias Kumm:  
 
I think I understand and have sympathy of Jose-Manuel’s criticism, at least if that criticism 
is targeting those who do legal theory and jurisprudence. These academics are too often 
preoccupied with formal questions, the concept of law, the idea of sources, of system – 
they rarely exhibit either a critical understanding of the moral point and purpose of law, 
or an understanding of how actual legal practice might serve to legitimate relationships of 
domination.  In fact I believe that behind different conceptualizations of the legal world we 
should make explicit different assumptions about what is normatively attractive and what 
is not, what works and what doesn´t and what is important and what is not. When we think 
about the competing different paradigms and different ways of imagining of the legal 
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world, then what we have to do, and need to do, to adjudicate between them is to think 
what they assume to be the point and purpose of law and what other assumptions they 
come with. Law is a medium through which the exercise of power is legitimized. But it is 
also potentially a medium through which the exercise of power – even the exercise of 
power by formally legal instruments – can be criticized. Once the law fundamentally 
embraces a commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, we have the 
resources to subject any part of the law to criticism from the internal point of view 
established by these commitments. These commitments provide a way of legally 
constraining and guiding the task of regulating markets, for example, to ensure that they 
do not produce or recreate relationships of domination, but ensure fair and efficient 
allocation of opportunities and resources.  
 
We should be critical of ways of conceptualising law that tend to rationalise and legitimise 
certain forms of dominant power. More attractive is a conception of the world of law that 
provides the internal resources to criticise forms of domination as deficient. This is one of 
the criteria for a normatively adequate conceptualization of the world of law. If there is a 
competition between different paradigms and different ways of reconstructing the world 
of law here is how we should decide between them: First, we ask whether a conception 
actually fits the world as it actually exists. Does it reflect to a sufficient degree the 
conventions central to those who are engaged in the practice of law. Second, among 
competing conceptions that meet the requirement of fit, we ask which conception is 
attractive morally: which furthers the ideal of justice and has the resources to critically 
call out forms of domination covered up in legal form. The idea of coherence and system, I 
believe, is central to all plausible conceptions of law. But how these ideas are worked out 
in conceptions of global law, transnational law or global constitutional law, is a question 
about what best fits legal practice. On this I follow Ronald Dworkin (even if, as an 
American jurist, he developed his jurisprudential account primarily in the context of US 
constitutional law and discovered international law as a serious field of inquiry only very 
late in his career). 
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Neil Walker:  
 
I think you identify one of the problems and certainly here I would be critical of the 
limitations of my own work. The problem is actually trying to work out the relationship 
between the global law and actually a broad conception of global justice. And what Mattias 
is just getting at here, is one at least partial conception of what global justice might be. But 
think about this – before we can even begin to frame a substantive conception of justice 
we also have to engage with all the questions who gets to decide, what voices are heard 
and what context etc.  
 
So, there are a number of different ways in which we actually disagree and we do not even 
begin to have a shared horizon of understanding. One is that some people understand 
global justice as a singular thing – there is only one planet and justice is something that 
should be organised across that planet. Other people, e.g. John Rawls, think of global 
justice in plural terms - that actually the globe is not one justice community but it is 
instead a whole bunch of justice communities – let’s call them people or states. Bu this 
would never be agreed by one-worlder like Peter Singer or Thomas Pogge. So you already 
have that massive divide about what we are even talking about when we mention global 
justice. Are we talking about a single unit, or are we talking about an aggregation of 
different units?  
 
A second distinction we have is between what I would call a holistic and a functionally 
composite notion of global justice. There is economic justice, environmental justice and all 
different things – do they all come together organically or can we compartmentalise them 
and say that we have environmental justice, economic justice and political justice etc. as 
discrete objects of our political morality? Again, even when before you answer the 
question, you have to answer the ‘meta’ question, whether you can think of it as a whole or 
you think of it in terms of segments. And then there is another set of questions which has 
to do with scale, scope and intensity. Is global justice a set of general parameters, which is 
then filtered down in specific areas? Are we interested in notions such as due process, 
margin of appreciation, ideas of proportionality, subsidiarity, and then we would leave it 
to the world to develop these in different contexts, or is global justice something that 
penetrates very deeply into particular communities?  
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So the problem is that, on the one hand, we have this massive question of whether we can 
even imagine how global justice might be produced. What is properly  ‘global’ about it?  On 
the other hand, even if you imagine that we were to resolve that in an adequate way, we 
then have to move on to all the debates about all the contestations that we have amongst 
ourselves, or sometimes do not have – instead we silently pass over them -  about what 
global justice is? You can have a concept of global law which is largely unconnected to the 
concept of global justice. And Mattias is not a culprit here – he is one of the few people that 
have tried to connect them closely together. But not that that many people do so – 
apparently because it is massively difficult and it raises all sorts of questions. Not only 
practical questions, but very difficult questions of political philosophy. About how we 
imagine the world hanging together, and not necessarily in the terms of global law, but in 
terms of justice and how the world looks like in terms of a range of overlapping  justice 
communities. 
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
If I may step in there. It is great that Neil has already touched upon the grand question of 
global justice to which we shall return shortly. However, it would be perhaps appropriate 
at this stage to put some order onto what has been said in the last hour or so. Neil, I really 
liked your anecdote about that GAL conference at NYU, because it points to the heart of the 
matter. We are talking today about transnational and global law not because they are some 
fancy scholarly inventions, but because they are real. They do really exist and as you have 
said somewhere in your book, their existence is inevitable. This means, obviously, that 
people at NYU did not make up global administrative law, but they only provided for a 
conceptual framework – they invented the glasses through which we have since been able 
to see that there is indeed something beyond the state, that there is something like global 
administrative law.  
 
Consequently, this means that when we are talking about transnational and global law, we 
are in this constant oscillation between practice that is already there and our theories 
through which we want to understand this practice. By doing so, we are simultaneously 
socially constructing this very practice through theories that we are developing. What is 
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very important in this relationship between theory and practice, is a cognitive frame that 
we start with. What are our normative biases with which we enter this theoretical framing 
of what is going on? That is one difficult question. But the other one, which is on the lower 
level of abstraction and with which we might finish this first part of the session, is the 
following.  
 
Mattias has said that it is obvious for lawyers that there are many sources of law out there, 
beyond the state. Is this really the case? In many countries people, and not only them, also 
lawyers still think that they are working inside a cocoon, within a self-sustained and 
closed solipsistic state, in which only state law is the law of the land. There is indeed the 
challenge of getting to know about transnational law. And, I believe, it is the legal 
education that has an important role to play in this. Would you agree? 
 
Neil Walker:  
 
Yes, but one thing you cannot say here, and I do not think that anyone would disagree, is 
that what I call the state system has disappeared. There is still a way of talking about law 
in general by reducing it to the state law. Equally, you go to any international law faculty 
in any country of the world and you will meet people who will use all of their intellectual 
ingenuity to try to explain to you that, actually, the new diversity of transnational law   is 
a matter of incrementally expanding the sources of international law. And all other legal 
phenomena can somehow be reduced back to these two sources. And I think it is always a 
pyrrhic victory when they do that, because you have managed to reduce the world to these 
terms – well done! And you have provided a framework of understanding which obscures 
as much as it illuminates by doing that. And, actually, you need these other perspectives as 
well to make better sense of these debates. 
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
But the problem might be even worse because you might even have a majority of people 
arguing that nothing has changed and they do not even care what, if anything, is going on 
beyond the state. It is not only that they would like to reduce transnational law back to the 
state as an exclusive source, but their horizon is simply so limited that they think that all 
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that there is, is their state. And, as far as I can see, it is only by way of legal education that 
these horizons can be broadened.   
 
Mattias Kumm:  
 
Let me take up Neil’s example of global administrative law project, because there was an 
important normative idea behind it: They noticed there was all this stuff going on – there 
were all these institutional actors – the World Bank, the IMF etc. making decisions that 
actually impacted states and the lives of people living in those states, considerably. These 
were not high level decisions, not the things you read about in the newspapers, generally. 
These are the kind of mid-level administrative decisions that as an international lawyer 
you were not likely to have studied. But they are important and they affect people lives. 
They have real consequences. And there is money being distributed – considerable 
amounts. National policies are being influenced; and nobody is studying this. Why does 
nobody study this? Because people are stuck in the cognitive framework of studying only 
national law or the grand issues of war and peace and diplomatic relations that are at the 
heart of traditional international law courses. These practices matter a great deal, they 
affect people´s lives, but people and lawyers are only educated within the statist 
framework, so they do not see it! And because they do not see it, they cannot adequately 
and intelligently deal with it. They cannot criticize it, they cannot engage it constructively, 
they cannot strategize how to make things work for the country that is affected by it. 
Their idea was “we have to study this”. We have to make this the focus of study – we are 
going to build across the continents a group of people studying these things, analyse the 
procedural and substantive norms governing this practice and the outcomes they produce 
and then critically assess it.  
 
What then came into view is the fact that in some contexts the procedures used were quite 
problematic. If you take standard principles that we know from domestic administrative 
law in liberal constitutional democracies: participation, accountability, transparency, 
justification, reason giving, etc.. And when we apply these standards to international 
institutions, we realize that in a number of contexts there are deficiencies and there is a 
need for reform. But, that will only happen, if there are appropriately informed critical 
actors who are aware of these practices and who have thought about the normative 
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significance of those practices and then go on to insist that there are standards that these 
institutions should meet. So this is a normative agenda associated with the idea of global 
administrative law.  
 
Let me give you another example: The way that constitutional law is normally taught. The 
standard way of teaching constitutional law is to use a textbook focused on the provisions 
of the national constitution and the legal practice that has emerged interpreting these 
provisions. In Slovenia there will be a textbook on Slovenian constitutional law, just as in 
Spain it will be about Spanish Constitutional law and in Germany about German 
constitutional law. Such a textbook is likely to begin with a brief constitutional history of 
the country. And then you have the text. There are rights, separate branches of 
government, elections and the democratic process. All of this is taught as if national 
constitutional law is a distinctive and separate national thing, with hardly any reference 
to the outside – except perhaps when foreign powers controlled and undermined national 
independence and prevented the nation from having its own autonomous and independent 
constitutional law. Maybe on rare occasions a brief comparative reference will be made. 
Constitutional law is taught in a national cognitive frame.  
 
Of course it is crazy to study constitutional law in the early 21st century in Europe 
primarily in a national context. Most states, and all states of the European Union share a 
common DNA: The commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Thinking 
hard, in a theoretically informed, interdisciplinary way about what these commitments 
might mean in a more concrete institutional and doctrinal form is what the discipline of 
constitutional law should be all about. Drawing on different historical experiences and 
different interpretations the practice across states would inform the better understanding 
of what these principles amount to and under what circumstances which interpretations 
make more sense. It is crazy to study constitutional law only in a national context. These 
books ought to be rewritten and here is what they should do: they should provide an 
account of constitutionalism across jurisdictions in a theoretically reflected, 
comparatively and historically informed way, which would draw on national constitutions 
as examples and also make you think about the specificity of what we have decided in our 
jurisdiction and how it is different in others. This would provide a deeper understanding 
27 
 
 
of the rules that we have and why we have them and how they relate to other possibilities 
and other arguments why we might prefer them or not.  
 
So in other words, constitutional law as a heart of the classical domestic discipline is a 
discipline which ought to be, I think, taught a little like a global administrative law. In the 
sense that you draw on lots of different institutional practices and then you use the 
national practice as an example or illustration of how these things might work out. If you 
ask yourselves – what is the model for a textbook of this type (unfortunately I have not yet 
written one) it might be Carl Schmitt´s Constitutional theory (Verfassungslehre) in 1928.  
He wrote the constitutional theory of the liberal constitutional state, engaging its 
intellectual history, theoretical debates and comparative concretizations.  To be sure, he 
misinterprets the liberal constitutional state and there is much in the book that is 
misguided. But it exemplifies what it could mean to teach constitutionalism not as 
nationally posited law, but as the institutional and doctrinal concretization of a set of basic 
principled commitments. So this is history, theory and doctrine coming together in kind of 
a wider, theoretically informed, comparative, global, context. We should seriously ask 
ourselves: Are there good reasons why do we teach this the way we do? Should we give up 
teaching core areas of law – constitutional law. Contracts, torts, in a national cognitive 
frame? Should we not do it quite differently?  
 
Neil Walker:  
 
There is a new degree course in Tilburg in Holland, which is, I would say, the first place 
since the Middle Ages where the way their undergraduate students study law is by doing 
an undergraduate degree in global law. And then only  at the postgraduate level do they 
study domestic law. I am not close enough to see how the syllabus works, but it seems to 
me fascinating intellectually. It is based upon an idea that you can make a coherent sense 
of the notion of law without reference initially and foundationally to any particular 
system. So you understand it in general before you understand it in particular. And that it 
is so much against the intuition of the most people teaching law that it makes it quite an 
ambitious thing. Of course in the Middle Ages when there was no systematic local law, it 
made sense that people understood law by a reference to Roman law as a unique recorded 
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canon for understanding law. That was in a pre-state system. It is much more ambitious to 
try to do this now in a state based system. 
 
Mattias Kumm:  
 
So, if I may use one daring analogy. Imagine you were an engineer and you wanted to 
learn about engineering – the law governing the constructions of dams, bridges etc. and 
imagine you went to a national faculty and that faculty would teach you exclusively and in 
great detail how the local dam was constructed and how the bridges that go over the major 
river of the country, how the statics work, how they relate to the materials used and the 
surface structure. Now you can do that because the general law governing engineering 
also apply to the local dams and bridges, but it would be weird to construct the curriculum 
around these bridges, dams and tunnels, rather than seeing these bridges, dams and 
tunnels as instantiations of generally applicable laws and features applied to a very 
particular context. And of course the context matters, it matters what the particular 
grounds and landscape etc. is like and what exactly you want the bridge to be used for etc. 
So, this is not about the universal laws that are just simply applied, but is about 
contextualising them and making them fit in within the local culture and history. But it is 
something universal that you make fit – nobody believes that an engineering curriculum 
should be designed along national lines. We should think about whether this is perhaps a 
fitting analogy to what legal studies might become.  Even though ultimately we make 
decisions locally and often at the state level, we do so informed by ideas and legal 
requirements, which are ultimately linked to commitments of a more universal sort, 
which are then concretized and specified in a way that is tailored to work in the local 
context.  
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
Before we go for a break, let’s invite back Gianluigi and Jose-Manuel. Gianluigi you have 
been critical of normative biases in this discussion, stressing that there is no neutral way 
to argue about transnational and global law. And, Jose-Manuel, your work has been about a 
critique of the Eurocentric western cognitive frame through which we are approaching 
and developing theories to frame what is going on now in the global arena. Before we go 
for a break, what is your reaction to the debate we have just had, in particular about the 
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importance of legal education? Those who are teaching, they come with certain epistemic 
perspectives and reproduce normative biases, aren’t they? 
 
Gianluigi Palombella:  
 
The question this time is about the cultural bias. Well, first, that is unavoidable. It is also 
very important to recognise this, in order to prevent the risk, that I see in some nuances of 
the discourse here, to imagine legality through some naturalist, universalist lenses, that 
would make comparative law similar to the study of engineering, physics, and pure 
sciences. But there is a cultural bias even in the critique of that cultural bias. And this 
must be recognised as well. I do not think that there are neutral, God’s eye positions in 
these discussions.  
 
Second, by way of example, think of “international law”:  it is an expression coined by 
Jeremy Bentham in about 1789 and together with the other leit motiv, that is, “civilised 
nations”, its story is meaningful. So, “international law” was born out of a western bias, 
not even western, it was European; and not even European, it was France and England. 
Then it came up the need to go beyond France and England, towards the European civilised 
nations;  and after, even beyond  the Jus publicum Europaeum, towards the rest of the 
world, when the latter was conceded the dignity to be part of the international law of 
civilised nations.  
 
Other expressions, words, concepts might have the same story. We cherish human rights, 
democracy, equality and morality, dignity, rule of law every time. These are biased 
notions. Everyone would say are Western notions. What are our attitudes towards them? 
Those have become so called “universals”. They have been mentioned in the foregoing. In 
my view, our positive attitude towards universals can be treasured despite its inevitable 
cultural bias.  Thus, let me side with Michael Walzer.  We do not avail of detached and un-
situated, or global, perspectives. Taken in themselves, regardless of any concrete 
application, these universals are very thin and sometimes appear in need of stronger 
meaning. They are often waved instrumentally, as an ideological tool in order to conceal 
inequality, exploitation, truth, and so forth.  However, from located and situated points of 
view normally these universals are voiced with a maximum of thickness and 
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meaningfulness, bearing a full content that however happens to be relatively changing 
even along the series of the restricted number of those ‘civilised’ nations.  
 
Our attempt should, in my view, try to treasure the duality of universals, without missing 
either of their two sides. I learned my approach from the Frankfurt school since my 
studies upon its ‘critical theory’ and the power of ideological tools – that conceal what they 
should not. But what I learned is also that universals bear a power of emancipation: as it 
was said, even the depiction of beauty in the bourgeoisie artwork (as well as some other 
ideas like human rights and democracy) where it is painted and voiced, beyond being an 
instrumentalisable matter, is also something universally caught and recognised. It brings 
of itself a “promise of happiness”. True. There is a sense that counters – beyond supporting 
– ideological strategies. Given their, albeit thin, perceivability, universals prompt a vision 
onto the possibilities, of how any present reality can be judged, confronted, measured, and 
perhaps overcome.  
 
Accordingly, and turning to the justice question, raised by my colleagues, I like to remind 
the Preface of Amartya Sen’s book, ‘The idea of justice’, where a sentence of Pip is quoted, 
from Charles Dickens ‘Great expectations’: “there is nothing so finely perceived and finely 
felt, as injustice”. In the line I have exposed so far, what we should use our intuition for – 
in the global setting – is not searching for some shared fully-fledged justice, but 
eminently curing the problem of injustice, and  working with law to avoid it. In the global 
setting our primary task is not to construe a global justice substantive compact, but to 
counter so often widely visible injustice. What we should avoid is that law itself becomes a 
sheer legitimating arm. If we get rid of those universals, we let their ideological power 
ends, but at the same time we get rid of them as intuitions of injustice and instruments of 
empowerment.  
 
Jose-Manuel Barreto:  
 
Something about legal education. I would like to mention the case of the Colombian legal 
education. I think the Law curriculum in Colombia may coincide with the way Mattias and 
Neil have described as a nationally orientated pensum. However, in Constitutional Law we 
have something different.  In Colombia we have a law degree that lasts five years, with 
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subjects that are one year long.  In the first year we have General Constitutional Law, and 
in the second Colombian Constitutional Law. So in the first year we learn about the French 
constitutional history, the English constitutional system, the US constitutional history, and 
a bit about German and Spanish constitutional law. Because of our Eurocentrism we look 
for models in Europe.  But this is also due to the fact that we created our constitutional 
regime on the basis of those systems. Already in the late 18th century and early 19th 
century, the struggle for independence against the Spanish empire was inspired by the 
French Rights of Man and also by the US Declaration of Independence. So in some way we 
used a very modern and Eurocentric tradition to fight against another Western tradition, 
that of imperialism. And when we adopted our first constitutions at the beginning of the 
19th century (we had  a number of federal constitutions) in every single one,  there was a 
Bill of Rights.  Apart from this,  in General Constitutional Law we also deal with 
constitutional  theory  and we read authors like Carl Schmitt, Karl Lowenstein, and 
Maurice Hauriou. Drawing from the European legal tradition provides a wide 
understanding of the law. But there is also a negative side of this study programme: we 
know sometimes more about European constitutional history than about Latin American 
history. 
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
On this note I think it is the right time to make a break. In the second, more normative 
part, we will be left with three more questions on the table. These are certainly not simple 
questions, but are big and grand questions that would require a special workshop for each 
of them.  
 
These three questions are: What is the impact of transnational and global law on the rule 
of law?; What is the impact of transnational and global law on democracy?; What is the 
impact of transnational and global law on the idea and practice of justice? 
 
We might start with the first question – are transnational and global law contributing, 
enhancing the standards and practices of rule of law, and on which level? Nationally, some 
supranationally or globally? What would be your reflection on this Neil? 
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Neil Walker:  
 
This goes back to something we have already discussed – we cannot really have an 
intelligent conversation about the rule of law unless we actually have a theoretical 
conception of law that we agreed upon. So if we have a positivist conception of law which 
is about pedigree and social sources, basically we will come to one kind of answer to that 
question and we will say that one of the things we have to register is that companies and 
empires are the sources of law as well as states etc. And of course it is broader than that – 
we actually see one of the features we have talked about re post-national and global law is 
the sheer diversity of new sources of law. That brings with it certain problems, because 
within a certain conception of legal pedigree there are all sorts of contested cases 
concerning whether some bodies are legitimate law makers, legitimate sources of law.  
 
But of course there is another side to this. One of the things that is happening with all of 
this is that the very idea of particular sources becomes problematic, and so we might 
concentrate less on this than the general DNA of legality. Mattias used the example of 
global administrative law. If it were developed further, we would observe that people at 
global administrative law project, having identified the problem and having said  - look, 
there is something about these structures which look like the kinds of structures which 
would at the national level attract a certain type of normative discipline. We think 
therefore that they should also attract that normative discipline within these 
transnational spaces. Whether it would be some certain private bodies or hybrid bodies or 
informal intergovernmental institutions that fall between international law and domestic 
law.  
 
So their argument is of a different kind, which says we do not find law simply by looking 
at sources. We do not find law by looking at sources and working out, whether it applies if 
there are gaps. We find law by reference to a system of coherent political morality, which 
requires that all analogous situations of a certain type be subjected to the same kind of 
normative structure.  
 
We all know that there is another massive tradition within western - but not just western 
civilisation - of natural law, of a kind of way of thinking about social order, which say that 
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you have a whole bunch of problems which are replicable over a very wide range of 
contexts. Law attracts itself naturally and normatively to that range of context. Klaus 
Günter who is a Habermasian thinker, defends the idea of a universal code of legality. He 
says that within the Habermas’ framework of communicative rationality you think of a 
universal code of legality which has things within like the binary distinction between 
guilt and non-guilt and notions of responsibility/immunity, relationship between duties 
and powers and a whole range of other basic framing dualities which we take for granted 
as part of the basic structure of all  law. And his point is actually that there is a massive 
level of general agreement about what legality means. And it has nothing to do with 
sources.  Who thinks this way? Sometimes judges do it this and sometimes administrators 
do it, sometimes jurists do it, sometimes normal members of the public do it.  
 
When you make such an appeal, whether in the large context of the Nuremberg trial, or 
whether in the context of the most basic  administrative law question,  you make an 
appeal to legality which is not exclusively based upon sources. So in an odd way global law 
both problematises the rule of law by pointing towards the disorder of different sources, 
but also  re-normativises our sense of the rule of law by forcing people to think about the 
possibilities of the universal or general codes as normative frameworks that release them 
from these pedigree questions.  
 
Now, I am not advocating here some notion of free floating legality, where there are 
certain philosopher-kings who get to decide what the law is. What I am saying is, that 
there is something within a deep cultural anthropology which dictates that we all always - 
already think about certain questions in the context of a certain type of a normative 
framework. And we look at the projects like global constitutionalism, global 
administrative law in this way. Part of what is going on there is a kind of constructivism 
underlain by a shared moral intuition. That is an important aspect of legality as much as 
the rule of law understood as adherence to certain textual constraints. 
 
Jose-Manuel Barreto:  
 
I would like to comment on Neil’s insistence on the idea that when we speak about global 
law, we are speaking not only about sources; that there is another way of approaching 
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global law, rather than giving too much prominence to the question of sources. I agree 
with the idea that transnational and global law are not only about sources. But the 
question of sources is very important. And this is because, if there is a key contribution of 
global law and transnational law to the contemporary debate is that they point to the legal 
operators that had been creating  the law and having enormous consequences for 
everybody around the world, without any proper  understanding or  legal control.  From 
the point of view of the victims of colonialism, the question of having clarity about how 
empires, corporations and international financial institutions create the law, or enforce it, 
over or against national law, is crucial.   We need to approach these topics with a very 
historically informed frame of mind, and being politically involved. In fact, I approach this 
topic in search of ideas or legal arguments that can be used by communities that,  all over 
the world,  are fighting, for instance, to keep the sources of water uncontaminated, against  
companies that are  extracting oil using fracking.  It is in this sense that the question of 
sources is very important. 
 
Neil Walker:  
 
And so is the fact that people can see that once they have laid bare the sources of law, what 
remains is this other conception of law. Let us say there has been a deforestation 
movement, which is pushed by the forces X, Y and Z, who get to make these unauthorised 
or dubiously authorised directives within a certain community of interest. Actually we are 
going to keep coming back in some more general register in the name of some notion of 
global administrative justice. We actually do not necessary control the sources. So one of 
the ways to engage in a politics of law is to fight one type of legality or one register of 
legality with another register of legality. So what we are saying is not incompatible. I 
think it is important, but it is not just about pointing critically to  whom has the norm-
conferring power,  but also about coming up with other conceptions of legality  in the 
absence of a strong pedigree, or in contestation of that pedigree. So one is intervening in 
ways to say that we think this should be the law, and this should be the subject of 
administrative justice, so in the absence of a better way let’s kind of bootstrap that 
conception of administrative justice. 
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Mattias Kumm:  
 
This is important. On the one hand sources remain important.  The idea of sources is a 
formal idea, but we care about it because each “source” is connected to a particular 
procedure used to generate law. What we want to know, is who gets to participate in that 
procedure and who is excluded etc. There is a question of power underlying talk about 
sources. Say we have UN Security Council enacting a resolution, requiring Member States 
to freeze assets of individuals on a black list established and maintained by the UN 
Security Council. On the list are people claimed to be channelling money to terrorist 
organizations. Their names are proposed by the representatives sitting in the relevant 
Security Council Committee, who are themselves informed by their relevant intelligence 
agency. Let´s assume you happen to find yourself on that list. There may be a good reason 
for why the UN is establishing such lists, but given the nature of the procedure used (there 
was no hearing of the affected individual) and the lack of available legal remedies this is a 
deeply problematic procedure from a normative point of view. But now you contest your 
listing by invoking human rights norms against this source of law – claiming it should 
not, under the circumstances, be respected – because it does not meet basic requirements 
of due process. This lack of due process on the UN level, you claim, is sufficient reason for 
the European court not to effectively enforce these provisions in Europe. So ultimately the 
authority of any sources of law are measured by their respective respect for basic legal 
principles, that are implicitly treated as constitutive of law´s claim to authority: If  a 
source based law is clearly violative of these constitutive principles, it´s claim to authority 
will not be recognized. This is the kind of dynamic between sources and commitments to 
foundational principles that I take to be constitutive for the idea of global public law in the 
21st century.   
 
Neil Walker:  
 
And thankfully it includes the law of law making. It includes that. So you can actually use 
it  more broadly– the ratio/voluntas, or reasons and sources distinction does not then 
reduce to you saying  “ohh it is a shame you did not have the pedigree to do this…”, 
because the identification of proper pedigree is itself subject to reasoned argument. Say 
within global constitutionalism or global administrative law, the argument might be that 
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the rule of law demands that you have title and voice within this decision making 
structure.  
 
Mattias Kumm:  
 
Yes, exactly, that is how I see the relationship between reason and pedigree in global 
public law.  
 
Gianluigi Palombella:  
 
The question of sources can be reframed as it has been in fact developed, in terms of 
different legalities (think of self-referential legal regimes). It is another way to see the 
sources, even more comprehensively. Since I have already spelled the question of legality 
before our break, let me touch now on a connected and crucial question, the relations 
between sources, and that between these legalities. One might construct global law in a 
monist way under the primacy of the highest and largest legality, given its alleged 
coordinative role and its overall view (say, the Security Council within the UN, or mutatis 
mutandis, the WTO), one that is clearly unavailable from a particularistic or state or 
national or country based point of view. The risk here is the warrant of unconditional 
supremacy of global law upon state legality, for example: in this case we would pave the 
way to unbalance and asymmetries. We find on the one hand, some deracinated legalities, 
the global legalities of specialised regimes, that have no democratic credentials, no social 
embeddedness and no bottom-up legitimacy, but only top-down imperatives to impose. On 
the other hand, these deracinated global authorities cannot work but penetrating and 
impinging upon other lower legalities, state legality included. How would the entire 
setting work?  Sovereignty, autonomy and social needs of the communities and polities 
shall have to surrender the coordinative, world-reaching imperatives supported by a 
monistic construction of law on the globe. This sounds wrong. 
 
Of course, I understand the argument supported by Neil, manly about the availability of 
some universal sense of legality. Again, I already said about the updating of requirements 
of legality in one of my preceding interventions in this discussion. Now, from the point of 
view of the concerns that Jose-Manuel was raising some minutes ago, how we construe the 
37 
 
 
shelves and pieces, the global mosaic, matters a lot: because our constructions should 
better account for legalities having different consistency, degree of thickness, and 
different fabric, that cannot simply surrender to homologation without loosing their 
meaning. That’s the risk of juridification, precisely colonization in the sense that 
Habermas voiced in the 80s: the fact that some technocratic efficiency-based imperatives 
are straightforwardly allowed to colonise the social worlds and especially those parts of 
the life-world, in which the most important elementary social bonds are placed, and are 
reflected by sensitive autochthonous labour law, education law, health law, criminal law 
etc. Habermas was resisting a kind of top-down Welfare juridification in the 80s: by the 
way, that very scheme was precisely repeated, after decades, in some passages of the 
German Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon treaty, defending some areas of social 
embeddedness of law, some fabric of the community that had to be prevented from being 
legislated by external authorities. The argument was one vis à vis the EU law. I submit, 
even more so would be the case regarding threats from ‘global’ law. 
 
Of course, I am not simply asserting an apology of national sovereignty, nor downplaying 
the progress and transformations, in international law itself. Admittedly, it has been only 
the law traditionally between states, it was intended to cover and legally regulate the 
external independence of states, and not their internal autonomy. Now international law 
interferes continuously into states’ internal autonomy as a great amount of international 
norms affects directly the space of self-government, and impacts upon domestic 
democracy. Sovereignty now includes this account, while interference between legalities 
is the rule. The point is that changing some justified interference into unconditional, it 
turns into domination, which is unacceptable.   
 
How can one make a distinction? First of all, in a civilised extra-state context, any player, 
each legal order should avail of their capacity to cooperate, argue, and confront each other: 
resist in case of unjustified opposition, but on the basis of legal arguments, surfacing in 
the frame of a case at stake. This kind of legal confrontation is something that helps re-
accounting for sovereignty: not even sovereignty is unconditional, nothing is, and 
interlocutors should be capable of justifications: giving reasons in order to support their 
claims in specific circumstances. The dynamic of this relation has clearly not much in 
common with the monistic architectures that would make such a relation among legalities 
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work on a formally hierarchic basis. As much as sovereignty should not be allowed to win 
through the parochial use of egoistic and unjustifiable choices interfering against others, 
the reverse holds true as well, and neither international entities and global law would win 
unconditional priority basing on sheer self-referential argument: think of the many issues 
between say the EU and Greece, WTO and EU, WTO and India, and the like. The logic of the 
relation among orders and that of the viable legal arguments depends on the capacity to 
reason by taking into account the entire import of the issue at stake, in a multilateral, not 
unilateral, perspective, one that is not framed like a pyramid and cannot forfeit legitimate 
countervailing reasons. Those reasons of course are before the eyes of the world. This is 
the use of the rule of law in this context, a law limiting laws and other overbearing 
legalities. The relationships between different legal orders depend upon the creation of a 
space of legal means (instead of a wild context of power) of that kind.  
 
It should be a place in which it is possible to conceive the possibility of justice. It is a well-
known Kantian view, the one according to which the so called imperative of public law is 
defined as the duty to shift from the state of nature onto civil society. It is not that the 
birth of law creates the necessary justice, but, importantly, it creates the conditions for the 
coexistence and the possibility of justice.  
 
Neil Walker:  
 
Can I say one thing about that? I agree with everything you said, but the problem is that 
you cannot make it sound as if the global law is just a law of conflict resolution. There are 
different places and they have different types of claims and jurisdictions. Some are more 
or less embedded than others. Some rules are actually rules of private international law, 
or conflict of laws, but that is the least of it. It can be rules of constitutional pluralism etc. 
by which they resolve their relationships. One of the things I tried to do in my book is to 
say: look there is a type of global law which is what I call divergence accommodating – it is 
a crude term – but there is also a type of law which is convergence promoting – but this is 
also a crude term. But the point is that a lot of what happens in global law is precisely 
about finding forms of common normativity, which might come from classic top-down 
structures. It could be the UN law or it might come from a development of a corpus of 
human rights values which is seen not necessarily in these terms. Of   course, there are 
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pedigree sources for that – regional or other international bodies – but we have a sense 
there is something about the circulation of human rights ideas which does not necessarily 
depend on that. So what you have there also is this other body of normativity whose aim is 
not necessary to resolve disputes between jurisdictionally specific and jurisdictionally 
discrete levels. It is also about advancing a common type of normativity across levels. So  
global law is a complex thing and sometimes about the development of a quite thick 
context-independent global legal morality. We have to hang on to that as well. Otherwise it 
just becomes about a world where we continue to preserve the different levels and sites 
such that global law enters the picture  only in a context of an existing  conflict of interest 
or the conflict of perspective.  
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
But if I follow Gianluigi’s thoughts correctly – I think he implies, what we could call, a 
negative conception of transnational and global law. So the kind of law that is actually 
threatening and undermining the rule of law and democracy inside “the cradle” of 
democracy and the rule of law which was the state. But on the other hand, I think we were 
also hinting at more positive conceptions, saying that the practices are like that, 
competences and power structures have migrated beyond the state. The decisions are now 
taken somewhere else and they significantly affect our daily lives. And in that sense the 
role of global law could be to take and order these things and to tie them back to the 
national level. So global and transnational law, they do not necessarily need to be couched 
in a negative language, depicting something that threatens and undermines the rule of law 
and democracy on the national level, but they could also be enhancing them. So, global law 
as an emancipatory concept? 
 
Gianluigi Palombella:  
 
We were answering the question raised by Dr Barreto. I attached my comment to the point, 
that was precisely how to resist colonisation. So my words were explaining this 
perspective, not denying the other, or positive side. On the other side I totally agree. I am 
not making conflict resolution as the key, and of course we have all worked on the positive 
side of law beyond the states. And even beyond massive regulatory norms in global space, 
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think back of how many human rights universal agreements have been signed and often 
also institutionalised by states, and how much they worked, for example, even recently in 
central and eastern Europe. Most of those external documents have been ‘locked-in’ in 
order to promote and defend internal democracy, for instance. That is another among the 
examples of the positive normativity influence.  
 
Of course, the point is that we have been accustomed to think that what came from a 
supra-state outside, e.g. international law, was good, almost unconditionally and in 
principle. So resistance by state automatically amounted to a kind of a nationalism, and 
self-interested myopia. We have learned in last decades that it is not true. That even 
international law can be bad and might be resisted. But on the other side we perfectly 
know that human rights are something that we should respect through international law 
authority. And for the reasons that I recalled about universals earlier. So this positive-
negative oscillation is at work. And it is the life of this setting. 
 
Mattias Kumm:  
 
You are right, colonialism is the negative paradigm of what global law must not become. 
You are also right that among international lawyers there has traditionally been a bias to 
associate international law with “the good”, and if international law is good, more 
international law is always better… So there is that bias. But that bias is a professional 
response to a perception that international law does not matter and we don´t need to know 
anything about it or care about it. But this is not our world anymore, I think that much is 
clear. You really have to be completely blind to believe that international law does not 
matter and is not relevant. It matters in all kinds of ways – not all of them are positive. 
Conversely, we have no reason to believe that international law is always good and more 
international law is always better. Instead we need to think hard and debate in a context 
sensitive way what exactly we want from law beyond the state. We need to discuss 
critically the role of law beyond the state, what kind of structures are appropriate and 
what kind of structures are dangerous.  
 
There is something in the debate about law beyond the state I find deeply misleading. Here 
is the way how we should not think about the law beyond the state: There is a convention 
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– and this goes now to the democracy point, but also connects to our colonialism debate - 
there is a conventional view that says: “Look we might not know exactly what exactly the 
appropriate role of law and structure of law beyond the state should be, but at least we 
know what the paradigm of legitimate law is on the domestic level: It is the law of the 
liberal democratic constitutional state, with the constitution establishing a framework for 
self-government of free equal citizens. This allows us to know what is problematic about 
law beyond the state: It constrains the national demos, without being democratic itself. 
And that is prima facie a problem.” 
 
Now, I am not saying that what goes on beyond the state is harmless, but it is important to 
understand what is fundamentally flawed about this way of loading the dice. When we 
think of the world of sovereignty and democratic self-governance, without an appropriate 
embeddedness in strong international institutions, the only world we have historically 
known is the world of Empire. When British Parliament endorses or participates in the 
practice of Empire consolidation through its legislation, that does not make colonialism 
democratic. When the democratically elected US President, supported by Congress,  decides 
to engage in regime change in Iraq, that is not democratic. This kind of either formal or 
informal colonialism is just an extreme point of a more generalizable point which is that 
domestically made decisions often have justice-relevant consequences for outsiders. This 
happens not only when you fight wars or when you actually colonise a people. It happens 
also when a state authorizes a nuclear power plant, built right by the border, so if 
something goes wrong it will to a large extent affect neighbours rather than yourself. That 
means imposing potential externalities to others outside of your borders.  
 
What this illustrates is that no matter how democratic the decision to put that nuclear 
power plant there happens to be domestically, there is still a domination problem, a 
serious democracy problem. Because those whose plausible justice claims are seriously 
affected by it are outside of the boundaries and did not participate in that decision. So 
even a perfect democratic decision on a national level may be deeply problematic 
procedurally, because it burdens outsiders in justice-sensitive ways without giving them a 
voice. When you look more closely across a wide range of policy areas, this problem keeps 
appearing. There is no easy answer to all of this, and the point here is not to discredit the 
idea of national democracy wholesale, but to put it in its place. It is important to create 
42 
 
 
symmetry when we think of potential pathologies and dangers. We should not think of the 
domestic decision making is even presumptively fine, whereas decision-making beyond 
the state is presumptively burdened by democratic deficiencies. If you do not have 
international law, if you do not have law beyond the state, that does not mean that 
problems of domination disappear. Of course they don´t. This is the core point. On the 
contrary, the law beyond the state is a required structure to prevent domination by 
powerful nations. Sure, there are forms of international law which just present new forms 
of domination – I have argued that some bilateral investment treaties should be seen as a 
continuation of colonization with other means. But it is not the case that without 
international law, when there is only a world of domestic law, there is no domination 
between states. Domination also takes the form of national decisions that impose unjust 
burdens on outsiders. So this is an important point to make and to ensure there is 
symmetry in our discussion about global public law and to make sure that there is not a 
negative bias to begin with and when we start discussing the law beyond the state. 
 
Neil Walker:  
 
I want to say something which maybe gets to the specificity of the problem of the 
transnational law without saying it is better or worse than the national or the state law. 
Rainer Forst from Frankfurt is someone who talks about the right to justification. Basically 
he says, look, if you are going to think about law, power and politics historically, never 
start from a premise that law got off the ground before there was a problem. There is 
always an issue first, always an exercise, always an initiative. And there is always a 
counter claim. Someone claims a right to justification in response to a situation that 
already calls for justification. I am not saying this as a historical and philosophical rethink 
of how we construct a state and how do we construct legal order within and beyond the 
state. What we could argue is that the importance of the state was twofold – at a certain 
point there is a joint notion in the structure of the state and a legal order which achieves 
two sorts of goods. One is it creates a possibility of a democratic framework here, of a 
popular sovereign underpinning this, and a whole set of representational structures. And 
also it provides a depth and breadth and epistemic awareness of all the issues together as 
offers a joined up set of solutions. Politics is just a set of joined up answers to the 
patterned   instantiations of economic, cultural and other forms of power. So it is about 
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putting all the rights to justification together so that the state then becomes a resource for 
a making a very broad claim on the part of a whole population that they have a right to 
justification, for all the different forms of power which have perpetrated within the 
particular space. 
 
Bearing this in mind, the problem with transnational law is always double – it is a double 
problem. On the one hand – and everyone who thinks about this has a version of this – it 
is seen as having precarious legitimacy. Because it cannot do one of the things that a state 
can do. It cannot provide that democratic embedded platform, and so it is deracinated – in 
the way that Gianluigi was talking about. It is in danger, then,  of being unduly 
authoritative. On the other hand it is not joined up – not in the same way as state law. We 
have to control power beyond the state. We do not constitute that power, but we still have 
to control it. Beyond the state we only talk about controlling power. It is reactive rather 
than proactive. If it is something like environmental law, then of course transnational law 
is always trying to develop some kind of traction and so a greater degree of control. But 
what it cannot do is that it cannot join up environmental law to its economic foundations 
in the same way as you can within a national framework. It is much harder to do the 
joined up thinking. Often what you do is that you are dealing with fugitive power. So on 
the one hand transnational law often has doubts about its legitimacy – rightly or not, 
because of the democracy problem. On the other hand there are massive problems of 
effectiveness, because transnational law does not deal with an integrated space of the 
political, where all these different spheres are joined up, so any kind of normative knitting 
together becomes a much more complex exercise within transnational law. None of this 
undermines the basic  legitimacy of transnational law – it just means that the structure of 
the legal problem and the way in which the right to justification insinuates itself into the 
argument is different internationally than it is nationally. 
 
Mattias Kumm:  
 
I agree with this, I think. But just to clarify another fundamental flaw about how often the 
debate about the legitimacy of law beyond the state is framed, here is another often 
repeated but misguided argument: It is admitted that even when national institutions 
function well, there are a great many coordination and cooperation problems between 
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states that still need to be resolved. To resolve them you need to enter into all kinds of 
international institutional arrangements. But there is a trade-off to be made here:  
Although there are outcome-related benefits – we can now address these coordination and 
cooperation problems more effectively – we lose democratic input legitimacy. So in the 
end there is a trade-off to be made between input and output-legitimacy.  
 
It is very important to understand what is wrong in this account. It is not an appropriate 
account, because it does not take into account that there may be outsiders that are  
affected by national that have a potential claim to justification as Rainer Forst would say. 
They could criticize for example, that a nuclear power plant was established at the border. 
There is nothing inherently terrible about placing a nuclear power plant at the border. But 
say you are in Austria, where they decided that nuclear power is too dangerous, the 
residual risk of a disaster is deemed by the majority not worth taking, notwithstanding 
the promise of economic benefits. But right next door there is the Czech Republic and they 
decide that notwithstanding residual risks, the benefits outweigh these considerations. 
Both these decisions are legitimate, but if now the Austrian citizen claims that his 
legitimate interests were not appropriately taken into account by the Czech decision to 
build the nuclear power plant near the border, that claim is correct, if damage to his 
health did not factor into the cost-benefit analysis and he had no right to participate in the 
decision-making process. So if there are justice sensitive externalities at stake, then you 
want to have a structure that allows those outsiders to contest the decision on plausible 
grounds, and to have their interests be appropriately represented in this decision making 
process.  
 
There are different ways this could be done. It could be done through a bilateral treaty 
where you have the respective executives negotiate locational decisions, substantive 
stanbdards and procedural rights. Another option is to have an international organisation 
which drafts certain minimum standards for nuclear power plants, for example. So there 
are different ways for thinking about this and different kinds of structures that might be 
responsible, but the core point is that this is not about striking of balance between output 
legitimacy and democracy. This is a tension which is inherent in what democratic 
accountability, appropriately understood,  means.  
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Matej Avbelj:  
 
At this point we are ready to take a question or two. 
 
Question No1: How would you evaluate the capacity and/or willingness of states to 
enforce the multiple sources of global law? 
 
Question No2: Dwelling on the concerns connected to the negative conception of 
transnational and global law, could you elaborate a little bit more on how to resolve cases 
in which transnational regulation results in the lowering of human rights protection on 
the national level?  An example would be the Dublin regulation (including the amended 
version) determining the competent member state and their asylum policies. 
 
Jose-Manuel Barreto:  
 
I would like to answer the question about the enforcement of global law and transnational 
law. I think we are here in a very uneven field.  If a national court is to resolve a dispute  
between a transnational  company that exploits oil in Africa or South America and that 
court resides in Nigeria or Ecuador, there is  a huge possibility that the decision will be 
against the community or  the state that are attempting  to get  compensation or to 
restrain the projects  of that company.   There has been some possibility of looking for 
such a redress in, among others jurisdictions, a court in the US on the basis of national law 
and doctrine.  But there has been a retreat with the Kiobel case, in which the Supreme 
Court decided to create a higher threshold for a case to be brought before a US court. So, 
there is a bias in the current judicial arrangement that favours the position or the 
interests of the companies.  The problem is how to create and maintain a playing field, in 
which communities and big corporations are treated in a more fair way. 
 
Gianluigi Palombella:  
 
So if you were speaking about enforcement of global regulators diktat into state borders, 
the point is that for states there is normally no option. For most of states in the world it is 
impossible not to enforce, e.g. not to follow, for example, ISO. There is no exit. There is not 
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even a voluntary entry. Enforcement is in the air: this is a manifestation of power, and it 
is the asymmetry. Accordingly, in the lack of alternatives and choices, essential question is 
whether a legal institution is available where a claim to revision of a regulation can be 
justifiably raised. It is far more important than the question about who shall enforce that 
regulation. That is my view.  
 
Among many concerns, the main friction takes place between global jurisgenerative 
powers and polities and communities that are to implement their imperatives. The grand 
regulators have no comprehensive view. They must stick to their own mandate, that is 
specialised and field related. So if the system of patents and e.g. the conditions for the 
trade of pharmaceuticals are violating as a matter of fact human rights and the right to 
health in some poorer countries, well this was barely an issue for the system of patents. 
But it should be. Thus, another problem, beyond that of enforcement, is how to cope with 
the lack of comprehensive view on the ground, and make these imperatives not as 
unconditional as they are. So again it is a matter of balance through contextual 
justifications, and cannot be a matter of hierarchy between legalities. This would be the 
work of a rule of law based conception of the global sphere.  
 
And finally, I want to come back to the description of the problems by professor Barreto –
companies which dominate the market and laws that are incapable to protect the weaker 
or the weakest in these negotiations. We deal with Legality created simply in favour of the 
most powerful actors and players. I suspect that Jose-Manuel was referring to that layer of 
global laws that we should call transnational, in my view. Transnational in the sense that 
has to do with horizontal and spontaneous production of lex mercatoria-like regulations, 
barely reliable as a matter of guarantees and likely to simply privilege the position of 
those that hold economic power. What we and I especially was thinking about, when 
speaking of global law, was, furthermore, a vertical legislative capacity held by standing-
alone authorities, with rule making power, and often jurisdictional autonomy, creating 
rules curbing or guiding field related actions in a way that resembles some public function 
and escapes retail negotiation. There is this legislative and vertical ‘curvature’ of these 
entities that of course have to justify their exercise of authority in terms of coordination, 
and sooner or later this kind of premise leads to the question of their accountability and to 
a content-related test of universalizability. That is something that transnational law, when 
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it is only a matter of convention and bargain, is not in principle asked to do. In a sense, the 
test of justification, that is the link to universalizability, has to do firstly with the ‘vertical’ 
global law, with its public-law style orientation.  
 
We perfectly know that global character of law is a matter of reach, and as I said earlier, 
‘globality’ is a matter of fact. However universality is a normative threshold, a matter of 
justification. So there is no coincidence between the two. The legislative “curvature” that 
belongs, in my view, to global law, should be premised on the capacity to show some 
credentials of universalizability. When it cannot show these credentials then it is possibly 
resistible, eminently for lack of a multilateral, or more comprehensive, sight.  
 
Neil Walker:  
 
Can I say something about really important question of enforcement, but maybe I am just 
reinforcing what it has already been said? It is always easy in any context to pick up the 
lack of a particular enforcement mechanism of some norm as the key reason for its fatal 
failure.  But, really, it just means that in that particular context it did not work, nothing 
necessarily more fundamental. And these things happen within states as well for all sorts 
of reasons. Take this example – environmental law where you have a legal regime of 
complex trading of different types of emissions between different states who emit 
different types of pollutions within a kind of trading market, and where you work out 
what their overall allowances are etc. What does that kind of legal framework do in terms 
of compliance? It is massively effective in ways it has nothing to do with enforcement.  
 
One, it tackles a coordination problem – which you could not solve without the law. The 
law instructs how we should pull together. Secondly, it has an epistemic gain – there is a 
form of imagination there. There is one of the ways in which we use our social 
imagination to resolve problems. Thirdly there is a massive reputational dimension to 
this. So if you go ahead and sign up for this and then bluntly and transparently do not 
comply with it, you are not necessarily going to be thrown out of the club. But there are 
massive reputational damages associated with that. So no one should come to that 
framework and say that it lives or dies by the sharpness of its enforcement tools. Because 
that in the sense is almost epiphenomenal and unimportant, but people who say that that 
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is either the most important thing or that all these other goods that I am talking about – 
the epistemic, the coordination and reputational goods – only work because everyone 
know that in the final instance that there is a form of enforcement, are plain wrong; that 
just is not a sociologically adequate way of looking of what is going on there. So I think we 
tend to agree – I agree here with Gianluigi – the massive problem in transnational law is 
one of voice, who gets the voice and who gets to contribute to the norms. Is an input 
problem rather than an enforcement problem.  
 
Enforcement problem seems to me not really central. 
 
Mattias Kumm:  
 
About the EU law lowering the standards? It can happen. There is very little that is all that 
informative that it can be said about that.  
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
The Melloni case was to a certain extent like that. Spain argued there for a higher standard 
of constitutional protection and yet the EU said, no it is primacy – for the sake of 
uniformity and effectiveness of EU law, the lower standard needs to prevail. 
 
Mattias Kumm:  
 
Yes, so that is always a possible. But when that happens, then there are three kinds of 
responses. Firstly, when things happen domestically that we think are unjust, then we 
usually think about the political process as a way of changing that. We should think about 
unjust EU laws in a similar manner. So to the extent Dublin II is a disaster with regard to 
some of its provisions, well then let there be public outrage and a political process to 
change it. This might be somewhat more difficult, but in principle that is the same answer. 
Second, there might be a possibility to challenge the unjust aspects of Dublin II as a 
violation of human rights before the CJEU. If in a concrete context the conditions for 
mutual trust simply don´t hold and the rights of individuals would be seriously threatened 
if refugees were sent back to another Member State, then rules requiring such actions 
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should probably be declared to violate the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Third, 
if the EU solution is not just unjust, but meets some qualified threshold of injustice, there 
is always a possibility of using a pluralist structure of the relationships between the EU 
law and constitutional law and make the claim before the national constitutional court, 
perhaps seeking further support from the ECHR. If compliance with EU law would be a 
clear and serious infringement of domestic constitutional rights might be a reason for a 
national constitutional court not to enforce EU law. But that is only for extreme cases. I 
would not push this third solution too much.  
 
Matej Avbelj:  
 
On this note we have to stop and thank the audience and, of course, our distinguished 
guests. Obviously we have not exhausted the debate, there still are many questions left 
unexplored. This should be taken as an opportunity to continue this discussion at some 
other place and time. Thank you very much to all of you for coming. It was a great pleasure 
to host you in Ljubljana and I hope that you have enjoyed it as much as I have.  
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